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RECENT TRENDS
PROHIBITION OF MARIJUANA USAGE

The controversy surrounding the weed-like
marijuana plant continues.- Recent challenges
to laws prohibiting the use and possession
of marijuana have met with varied responses
which are sometimes difficult to rationalize.
People v. Serra2 represents one successful
challenge. That case involved a Michigan statute which created a presumption that possession of more than two ounces of marijuana implies an intent to distribute.3 The defendants
were charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver. This followed the seizure of several marijuana plants from their
yard along with various containers of dried
marijuana in their home. Affirming an appellate court dismissal of the charge, the Michigan supreme court held that the challenged
statute violated both the privilege against selfincrimination and the defendants' rights to due
process. According to the court, a presumption
is a legislative determination that gives force
of law to an otherwise ordinary inference. The
presumption created by the statute in question
differed from allowable presumptions because it
"involve[d] an inference from the fact of possession to the fact of the possessors' intent
rather than some fact which can be shown independent of the defendants' state of mind." 4
To rebut this inference the defendants were
forced to choose between either foregoing their
fifth amendment rights to remain silent or takI There are several good histories of the American attempt to regulate marijuana. See e.g., Bonnie
& Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56
VA. L. REv. 971 (1970). Recent additions to the
literature in the field include Balme, The Role of
the Criminal Justice System with Respect to Marihuana and Hashish, 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE QUARTERLY
176 (1973) ; Bartels, Better Living
Through Legislation: The Control of Mind-Altering Drugs, 21 KAN. L. REv. 439 (1973) ; Drug Offenses and Decriminalization: A Symposium, 3
HUMAN RIGHTS (1973).
2 _ Mich.
_, 223 N.W2d 28 (1974).
3 MICH.
CoanP. LAws ANN.
§ 335.341(2)
(1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1070(41) (2)
(1971).
4 _ Mich. at , 223 N.W.2d at 32.

ing the risk that the jury would draw the inference encouraged by the statute. This forced
choice gave rise to the constitutional infirmity.
For good measure the Michigan court also
found there to be no rational connection between the proven fact of possession and the
presumed fact of intent to deliver. 5
A Montana defendant found that state's supreme court less receptive than Michigan's in
responding to his chanllenge to a statute which
created a presumption that cultivation of marijuana is legally equivalent to the criminal sale of
marijuana 0 In State ex rel.LeMieux v. District
Court7 the Montana supreme court held that the
"cultivation" of marijuana comes within the
meaning of the word "sale." Therefore the court
did not need to reach the question of whether
there was a rational connection between the cultivation of the plant and the prohibited conduct
of selling the product.
The Michigan decision in Serra can be rationalized by certain practical considerations.
First, in 1973 the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws recommended the decriminalization of possession of and distribution
of small quantities of marijuanas An evidentiary rule promulgated pursuant to the 1973 recommendations would create a presumption that
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana
would be intended for personal use.9 The court
5 The court stated that the degree of certainty
necessary to sustain the presumed fact where statutory presumptions are at issue has not been firmly
settled by the United States or Michigan high courts.
Mich. at -, 223 N.W.2d at 35. Regardless of
which test used, this court would have found the
presumption involved invalid. See generally
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)
(presumed fact must flow from the proven fact beyond a reasonable doubt) ; Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumed fact must be more
likely than not to flow from the proven fact on
which it must depend) ; United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1956) (mere presence at whiskey
still insufficient to support presumption of possession).
6
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 54-132 (Supp. 1971).
7
Mont..--, 531 P.2d 665 (1975).
8 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §

409

(Supp. 1973), cited in Mich. at---, 223 N.W.2d
at 30 n.4.
9 See - Mich. at _ 223 N.W.2d at 31 n.5.
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may have felt that the legislature's intention
would be to follow the Uniform Act, even
though the legislature had deviated from the
Uniform Act with this presumption under
challenge. Additionally, viewing the challenged
Michigan statute in light of the Uniform Act
may have convinced the court of the statute's
infirmity.
Secondly, denying the prosecutor the use of
the "evidentiary crutch" created by the presumption is not likely to impede appropriate
prosecutions. Where a large amount of marijuana is involved, the inference of intent to sell
is there for the jury to draw without the aid of
the legislature. Strikinng the presumption shifts
the burden of going forward with the evidence
of intent to the prosecution. As the court suggests,"0 the prosecutor, rather than the defendant, could put on expert witnesses and acquaintances of the defendant in order to show
the requisite intent.
The Montana decision is more difficult to rationalize. Dissenting Justices Haswell and
Daly found that the statute did indeed create a
presumption of sale from mere cultivation and
that this presumption was clearly unconstitutional under Tot v. United States."' Using a
"plain meaning" test, the word "sale" would
encompass such acts as delivery or disposition
or exchange. 2 Only by judicial torture of the
word "sale" can "cultivation" be considered a
synonym. 13 The court would have been on
sounder ground had it cited to evidence showing that most cultivators in fact sell the plants
once they are grown.
One consistently unsuccessful method of
challenging marijuana regulations is to attack
as irrational the state's classification of the
cannabis plant and its various products as a
0 __ Mich. at ___ 223 N.W.2d at 34.

1319 U.S. 463 (1943). A federal statute provided that mere possession of a pistol coupled with
a prior criminal conviction create a presumption
that the pistol had been acquired in interstate commerce. In holding that the statute violated due
process, the Court determined that there must be a
rational connection between the fact proved and the
fact presumed. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969).
12VEBSTER's

NEV INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

2203 (2d ed. 1945).
"3The reader interested in an exploration of
this form of judicial reasoning can profit by reading L. FULLER, LEGAL FicwroNs (1967).
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narcotic. At least five state courts have recently been presented with and rejected this
argument.'14 The supreme court of Missouri in
State v. Burrow 5 adds that state's court to the
list of the unconvinced. The Missouri statute
challenged in this case put marijuana in the
same class as the so-called hard drugs of heroin, opium and morphine. The penalty for violating the law was not less than five years nor
more than life imprisonment for simple possession or sale.' 6 The sale of hallucinogenic
drugs is listed in a separate statute which
provides for a considerably less severe
punishment.' 7 Defendant Burrow, convicted of
the sale of four ounces of marijuana to a police officer, sought to overturn his sentence of
five years by attacking the statutory scheme on
equal protection grounds. Burrows argued that
the scientific community is in virtual agreement that marijuana is not a narcotic 8 and
that its effects are both very different and
"milder." Since the evil toward which the
statute is directed at eliminating is the "high" or
euphoria produced by the drug and its associated abuses, drugs which produce similar
"highs" should be classed together and those
that produce different effects should be classed
separately. To do otherwise would "lay an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other [which is] as an
invidious discrimination [as selecting] a par14 Warren v. State, 52 Ala. App. 35, 288 So. 2d
817 (1973); State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59,
505 P-2d 230 (1973); People v. Stark, 157 Colo.
59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965) ; Borras v. State, 229 So.
2d 244 (Fla. 1969); Reyna v. State, 434 S.W.2d
362 (Tex. Crim. 1968).
15
16

514 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1974).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 195.017 (Supp. 1973). The

penalties are for possession of not more than 35
grams and for the delivery of not more than 25
grams.
17 Illegal
sale of hallucinogenic substances is
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
from two to ten years, or by confinement in the
county jail for a term of not more than one year,
or by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by both
fine and confinement. Mo. Rxv.

STAT.

§ 195.270

(Supp. 1973).
18 The Missouri court noted that the defendant
presented "considerable authority in support" of
this proposition. 514 S.W.2d at 590. There are
many excellent scientific treatises on the classification of marijuana. See, e.g., L. GlINspooN,
BUANA RECONSIDERED

(1971).
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possessed cannabis saliva L. warranted a reversal of his conviction. Striking a blow for judicial individualism the judge noted that he was
aware of scientific treatises and expert botanical taxonomists that do not support his
finding.25 However, no such testimony was offered in his court. The court also recognized
that all species of marijuana, including cannabis sativa L., cannabis indica Lan. and ruderalis Jan. contain the euphoria producing agent
Another frequently losing argument used in
tetrahydrocannabinol. But he found the legislaattacking convictions under laws concerning
tive history unclear as to whether it was the
marijuana is that the federal statute prohibit"high" itself or the particular plant type which
ing the possession of marijuana" applies to
was to be prohibited. Indeed, ignoring the deonly one of three species of marijuana, caniabis
26
cisions of three circuit courts of appeals, the
sativa L. However, -thefederal district court of
incongressional
the
that
found
judge
district
the western district of Wisconsin, in United
clear that marijuana of a type other
was
tent
27
States v. Lewallen,2 has recently held that the
than cannabis sativa L. was not prohibited
government's failure to prove that the defendant
Since there is no reliable biochemical or spec19 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 trographic method for distinguishing between
(1942). A per curiam decision by the Illinois su- the various species of marijuana other than to
preme court in People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, view the growing plant itself,28 the decision in
275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), accepted a similar argument. There the court held that the Illinois Nar- Lewallen could present a severe set-back to
cotic Drug Act, which provided for a mandatory marijuana prosecutions. However, the overten year minimum sentence on first conviction of a whelming verdict from other circuits is that
marijuana offense rather than under the Drug
29
Abuse Control Act which provided for a maxi- the Controlled Substances Act applies equally
0
vioconviction,
first
mum jail term of one year on
to all species of marijuana. Since it is the
lated equal protection. The Burrow court noted
treatthat the Illinois legislature had changed the
25 Botanists now generally agree that there is
ment of marijuana offenders before the case was
but one species, cannabis sativa, and many undecided, making the constitutional argument superstable varieties or races which are, in effect,
fluous.
ecotypes, i.e., hemp seems . . . to differ from
20 The court cites to no authority except Chief
or approach the characteristic type in response
Justice Underwood's dissent in People v. McCabe,
to the conditions under which it is growing.
49 Il. 2d 338, 352-53, 275 N.E2d 407, 414 GaiNsPooN, supra note 18, at 35. Other author(1971). The Burrow court either was not made ity can be cited to show the existence of three
aware of or chose to ignore overwhelming evi- types. Compare Schultes, Random Thoughts and
dence to the contrary. For an excellent layman's Queries on the Botany of Cannabis, in C. JoYcE
guide to the most recent scientific developments & S. CURRY, THE BOTANY AND CHm sMxSRY oF
regarding marijuana see Brecher, Marijuana: The CANNABIS 11-38 (1970), with Schultes, Klein,
Health Questions-Is Marijuana as Damaging as Plowman & Lockwood, Cannabis: An Example
Recent Reports Make It Appear? 40 CONSUMER of Taxonomic Neglect, 23 HARv. BoTANNicAL
REPORTS 143 (1975).
MUSEUM LEAFLETS 325 (1974). See also R.
One noted authority has suggested that rather
ScHuLTs & A. HOFFMAN, THE BOTANY AND
than concentrating on what the drug is, we should CHEMISTRY OF HALI.UCINOGENS 58 (1973).
be concerned with the behavioral consequences re26 United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st
sulting from use. Contemporary Problems of Drug Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Gaines, 489 F.2d 690
Abuse: A National Symposium for Law and Med- (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rothberg, 480
ical Students, 18 ViLL.L. REv. 787,820 (1973).
F.2d 534 (2d dir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
21 The court heard no evidence on how wide(1973), aff'g 351 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ;
spread the use of the various classified drugs United States v. Moore, 446 F.2d 448 (3d cir.
actually was. Apparently, it took judicial notice of 1971), aff'g 330 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
the fact. 514 S.W.2d at 592.
27 "This statute is not vague; it applies to can22 Some of the questions involving statutory
sativa L. and to nothing else." 385 F. Supp.
nabis
classifications may be answered in Delp v. Ohio, at 1143.
for
petition
(1974),
N.E.2d
Ohio , (D.C.
F.2d 28 United States v. Walton, cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 26, 1974)
1975).
Cir.
(No. 810).
U.S.C. § 802(15) (1970).
2921
2321 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1970).
30 See note 26, supra.
24 385 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wis. 1974).

ticular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment." '9
In rejecting this argument the Burrow court
found that the medical evidence is not nearly
complete or unanimous in the rejection of mar20
ijuana's classification as a hard drug, and
jusdrug
the
of
use
of
the
that the prevelance
21
tified the more severe penalty. 22 The court
cited no authority for this position.
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Gengler3 5 the second circuit held that it had
such jurisdiction, despite the extenuating circumstances. The defendant, an Argentine citizen indicted in the United States on conspiracy charges involving the importation of
heroin, was successfully lured into Bolivia by
American narcotics agents where Bolivian police, paid by the American agents, arrested
him. He was later placed on board a plane
bound for New York City.
Conceding that the arrest warrant was enforced in an unconventional manner, the court,
speaking through Judge Kaufman, nevertheless
held that a court's jurisdiction is unaffected by
the manner in which a defendant is brought
before it. Absent any allegations of government
conduct amounting to torture or brutality,
there is no cause for the court to divest itself
of jurisdiction or to dismiss the indictment.
Only last May the second circuit's reversal
of the conviction in United States v.
Toscanino36 had indicated that the exclusionary rule, usually applied to evidence obtained
37
in violation of the fourth amendment, would
also be applied to defendants illegally brought
into the jurisdiction. Prior to Toscanino it was
settled doctrine under the rule announced in
Ker v. Illinois38 and later affirmed in Frisbie
v. Collins,3 9 that the government's power to
ABDUCTION TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION
prosecute a defendant was not impaired by any
The second circuit has once again con- illegality in the method used to acquire control
fronted and approved an old-fashioned type of over him.40 In Ker, the defendant was kidlawlessness in law enforcement-the -interna- napped in Peru by an Illinois Pinkerton agent
tional kidnapping of a person accused of a who failed to present the proper extradition
crime, and his forcible abduction into the ju- papers. After a trial in Illinois, the defendant
risdiction whose law has allegedly been sought to have his conviction reversed. The
violated. 33 In order for a court to gain juris- Supreme Court held that under these circumdiction of a criminal matter, it must have the stances, due process of law was satisfied as
presence3 4 in court of the accused. In Lujan v. long as a person present in court is convicted
after a fair trial in accordance with consti31 The court in United States v. Walton, (D.C. Cir. 1975), held that the 1970 Con- tutional procedural safeguards. The Court has
F.2d trolled Substances Act's proscription of cannabis
sativa L. applies to all marijuana. It also noted the
35 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
equal protection and due process problems with a
s6 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Recent
decision of the Lewallen type. Id. at 32 White House Announces Its New PerspecCases,88 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1975).
tives on Pot, 16 BNA CRIbi. L. REP. 2183 (1974).
37 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
33 The most infamous example of such a kidnap39 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
ping in modern times is the Israeli abduction of
39342 U.S. 519 (1952). See The Supreme
Adolf Eichman in 1960. The account is retold in Court,
The 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 89, 126
M. PEARLMAN, TnE CAPTURE AND TRIAL OF
(1952).
(1963).
ADOLF EICHMAN
is of course the usual
40 Legal extradition
3 Constructive presence may be sufficient; trial
from justice. The
fugitive
a
obtaining
for
method
v.
Missouri,
Drope
See
in absentia is possible.
Constitution so provides. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
(Mo. 1975).
S.W. 2d

,euphoric effects of the plant's use which are
:the object of the prohibition and since no lay
person could distinguish between one species
,of marijuana and another, the decisions which
reject the "one species prohibited" argument
are probably better reasoned. To agree with
the LewaUen decision could result in further
constitutional problems. The government would
incarcerate persons who obtain a cannabinol
high from sativa L. but not prosecute those
who obtain the same high from another species. Additionally, since no lay person could tell
the difference between the species, due process
31
notice requirements would not be met.
From these decisions one can conclude that
the courts make poor vehicles for change in
drug laws. Judicial integrity and principled
decision-making are threatened by laws which
are either not enforced or strangely interpreted. If the substantive offense of the use of
marijuana is to be modified or eliminated, it
can only be done at the legislative level. Recent developments suggest that such a change
may be forthcoming. 32 While the debate continues as to the possible adverse medical effects
of marijuana use, the adverse legal and social
consequences of a marijuana arrest and conviction make it a dangerous drug indeed.
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never abandoned the Ker principle, 41 and it
42
has been widely reasserted by the circuits.
In Toscanino43 the Second Circuit, presented
with particularly egregious police conduct,
grafted the due process considerations of Rochin v. California44 and the exclusionary rule
of Mapp v. Ohio 45 on to the jurisdictional
question. Toscanino had alleged (and the court
accepted as true) that paid agents of the
United States had forcibly abducted him from
Uruguay. He was held incommunicado for seventeen days in Brazil during which time the
agents alternatively interrogated and tortured
him. 40 All this occurred under the direction of
the Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and .Dangerous Drugs. He was not formally arrested until his arrival in New York.
The court held that if a defendant proves
this type of allegation, the government should,
as a matter of fundamental fairness, be obligated to return him to his status quo ante. The
court was unable to reconcile the decisions in
Ker and its progeny with the policy of discouraging official lawlessness as manifested by
Mapp and Rochin.4 7 The defendant's presence
in the court was analogized to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" 48 and dismissal of the case
against him was, in the court's view, warranted in order to deter future police miscon41

See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1974);
United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d
326 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Caramian,
468 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1972); Devine v. Hand,
287 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1961); United States ex
rel. Langer v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1956) ;
Chander v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949) ; Sheehan
v. Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 764 (1944).
43 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
44 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
42

45 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 The torture allegedly included sensory deprivation, intravenous feeding, fingers pinched with
metal pliers, fluids forced into anal passages and
electric shock administered to earlobes, toes and
genitals.
47 The analysis adopted by the court was first
suggested in Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MiNN. L. REv. 91
(1953).
48 See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REv. 579,
599 (1968).

duct. The court, relying on its supervisory
powers over the administration of the criminal
justice system, refused to become an "accom40
plice in the willful disobedience of law."
The most expansive argument in Toscanino
was the court's assertion that the Ker-Frisbiedoctrine had been so weakened by the Rochin,
Mapp and RwsseU50 cases that it would not
apply where a defendant had been brought into
the court's jurisdiction in violation of a
treaty. 5 ' Therefore, judicial scrutiny of illegal
police conduct was necessary and dismissal to
prevent any beneficial effects from illegal police conduct was justified. The court also analogized the criminal law jurisdiction to that of
civil law, where it is well settled that the defendant who is lured into another state by
fraud or forced against his will should not be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that
52
state.
While Toscanino clearly includes more due
process considerations into the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, other than merely a fair trial, Lujair
makes it equally clear that jurisdiction will be
divested only in light of shocking governmental conduct. The treatment of the defendant
Lujan failed to meet this test. The Second Circuit held that divestiture of jurisdiction is only
applicable in those cases that present egregious
factual situations involving torture, brutality or
some form of an official protest to the violation
of an extradition treaty by a foreign government. Lujan's arrest and abduction was merely
illegal, involving none of these added considerations. There were no allegations of shocking
treatment. There was no protest given by the
Argentine government.
The Lujan limitation on Toscanino is reasonable. First, violation of a treaty should not,
in and of itself, clothe the defendant with any
immunity from prosecution. International kidnapping violates the sovereignty of the nation
from which the defendant was taken. The
40

500 F2d at 276.

50 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-

31 (1973) (entrapment).
51 The court found that the actions there violated the United Nations Charter, the Charter of
the Organization of American States, and the
United States-Uruguay extradition treaty.
52J. BEALE, CoNmIcT OF LAWS, §§ 78.3, 78A
(1935).
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standing to complain belongs exclusively to
that government. Second, to redress the loss of
any rights, the defendant may institute a civil
suit for damages. 53 Moreover, the threat of
such damage suits (although remote as a practical matter), coupled with the inadmissibility
of any evidence discovered as a result of the
illegal arrest will provide the same deterrance
as would a blanket rule divesting jurisdiction.
Third, the criminal law is intrinsically different from the civil law (where the plaintiff is
not allowed to profit from his wrongdoing)
because of the state's overriding interest in
bringing fugitives to justice. In the criminal
area, only brutal or shocking police conduct
54
should be subject to the Toscanino remedy.
Despite the Lujan clarification, the essential
force of Toscanino continues. There remains
the same treatment of the defendant whose
presence was brutally obtained as of evidence
illegally obtained-the court will exclude them
both.55
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS

The

intricacies

of

the

equal

protection

clause F and the "spectrum of standards" 57 for

reviewing alleged discrimination continue to
cause difficulty for courts faced with deciding
attacks on statutes imposing sex-based classifications. Equal protection may be invoked to
ensure that a statutory classification which re53 Brooks v. Blackledge, 353 F. Supp. 955, 957
(W.D. N.C. 1973) (dictum).
54 The
second circuit's interpretation of the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine was adopted by the northern
district of Illinois in the recent decision of United
States v. Marzano, 388 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill.
1975). There the court denied a motion to suppress made by the defendants in the Purolator
vault theft who alleged that they were returned to
the United States from the Cayman Islands in violation of the American-British extradition treaty.
Citing Lujan, the district court limited Toscanino
to instances of brutal police conduct.
55 But see United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1973). Defendant, illegally arrested by
Vietnamese officials and turned over to United
States officials, was flown in chains back to the
United States to face charges of theft of government property. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the same analysis which supports
the exclusionary rule supports dismissal of the
charges, stating that the remedy is not an ouster
of jurisdiction.

56

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.

57 San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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sults in different treatment for groups otherwise similarly situated bears an adequate relationship to the purposes the classification is
intended to serve. Once a court has determined
that a classification discriminates on the basis
of sex, it must then decide what standard of
review is appropriate to test that discrimination. Whether sex has joined the group of
statutory classifications which require strict judicial scrutiny is not yet clear.58 A review of
several recent cases exposes the difficulty the
courts are having with this type of challenge.
In State v. Devall 59 the Louisiana supreme
court upheld a "females only" prostitution
statute90 against a female defendant's challenge
that the failure to ban men from practicing indiscriminate sexual intercourse for pay violated
the equal protection clause. The court conceded
that a man could not violate the statute by accepting compensation for his sexual favors.
However, in reversing the trial court's determination that the statute does unconstitutionally discriminate, the state supreme court
apparently chose the traditional "old" equal
protection test of minimal rationality."'
Under the minimal rationality test a court
will not set aside a classification if any reasonable set of facts may be conceived to justify
it.62 Empirical realities need not dictate the particular solution chosen nor is the over- or
under-inclusiveness of the classification scrutinized. The Louisiana court, applying this test,
reasoned that the legislature was free to exclude male prostitution from the coverage of
58 One student has written that much of the
confusion in the area of sex discrimination has
been encouraged by the absence of clear guidance
from the Supreme Court. Comment, Pregnancy
and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62
CAL. L. Rav. 1532 (1974). This work also provides a concise explanation of the various equal
protection tests. Id. at 1537-41.

59 __

La.__ 302 So. 2d 909 (1974).

"Prostitution is the practice by a female of
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with males for
compensation." LA. REv. STAT. § 14:82 (1950).
60

61

La. at

, 302 So. 2d at 912, citing Goe-

sart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1947) (Michigan
statute which provided that no woman could obtain a bartender's license unless she was the wife
or daughter of the male owner held not to violate
equal protection). The Goesart decision is of questionable continued validity in light of more recent
cases. See Sail 'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
48562 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961).
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the statute on the basis that it did not constitute a significant social problem. Absent a
showing that the sex-based distinction involving prostitutes is merely a pretext designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against members of one sex,63 the Louisiana legislators
were free to make the classification. 4
In a carefully reasoned dissent, Chief Justice
Sanders noted that male prostitution does indeed exist in Louisiana. 65 Reasoning that prostitution laws are meant to prevent the spread
of venereal disease, to shield citizens from annoyance and to control related crimes (such as
illicit drugs, gambling and organized crime),
the dissent found that male prostitution contributes to these evils on par with female prostitution. The dissent would have found the
statute violative -of equal protection, thereby
concluding that the sex classification bears no
rational relation to the objectives of the
legislature. 66
Devaol demonstrates the importance of which
standard of review the court decides to use.
Because the more lenient rational basis test
67
was used the state's classification was upheld.
The court could have found sex to be a "suspect classification" and applied a more rigorO The Louisiana court here confuses the tests
under equal protection. Since the classification was
deemed not suspect, the proper question was
whether the statute was rational or irrational. Invidiousness is relevant only in suspect classification
standards. It is possible that the court meant that
a statute with a bad motive is irrational. The
opinion, however, is unclear.
64 Other state supreme courts that have upheld
unisex prostitution statutes include Indiana, Wilson
v. State, 258 Ind. 3, 278 N.E. 2d 569 (1972), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1973), and Wisconsin, State
v. Mertes, 60 Wis. 2d 414, 210 N.W.2d 741
(1973). An Arizona rape statute applicable only to
male defendants with female victims was recently
upheld against an equal protection challenge. State
v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974). The
court applied a rationality test to find that the legislature need not protect males from female rapists.
65-.
La. at -, 302 So. 2d at 913. The dissent
cites to a valuable and exhaustive study in Rosenbleet & Pariente, The Prostitutionof the Crininal Ldw, 11 Amm. Ca m. L. REv. 373, 396 (1973).
66 Other courts have agreed that unilateral prostitution statutes violate equal protection. See e.g.,
(Alaska 1973). A conP.2d State v. Fields, stitutional attack on prostitution laws in general is
set out in Rosenbleet & Priente, supra note 65, at
376.
67 Reversals of state action under this standard
are traditionally scarce. See Morey v. Doud, 354

U.S. 457 (1957).

ous standard. Under this second standard,
strict judicial scrutiny is given to a classification based on any suspect criterion, such as
race"6 or alienage.60 Fundamental interests,
such as voting 70 and the rights of the criminal
defendant 71 have also been recognized as requiring heightened judicial scrutiny. To be upheld under this standard of review, the classification must serve a compelling interest, and it
must be shown that the classification is necessary in order to fulfill this interest. Had the
Devall majority found sex to be a suspect classification, the statute would have fallen.
A District of Columbia trial court, finding
sex to be a suspect classification, has struck
down a city ordinance72 (aimed at massage
parlors) as violative of the equal protection
clause. In Geisha House, Inc. v. Wilson 3 the
court found that there was no compelling interest in prohibiting members of one sex from
administering massages to the other. Because
the sex-based classification is suspect,7 4 the
court insisted upon the least intrusive means to
accomplish the goals of the statute. The court
indicated that a statute which prevented employment of persons with records of past criminal sexual conduct, or which would require licensing of individual masseuses or masseurs,
or which regulated the dress of customers would
have been more favorably received.7 5 The strict
68 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
69 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
70 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
71 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
72 D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-2311 (1967) prohibits
any female from administering a massage to any
male or any male from administering any massage
to any female in an establishment licensed under
the statute.
73 16 BNA CR. L. REP. 2048 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Sep. 25 1974).
74 [S~ince sex, like race and national origin, is
an immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of the particular sex because of their sex would seem to
violate the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility ....
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973),
cited in Geisha House, Inc. v. Wilson, 16 BNA
Ca. L. RP,. at 2050.
75 The court further found that the statute, by
creating a presumption that the illicit activity occurred only in licensed establishments, was irrational.

COMMENTS
scrutiny of sex-based classifications has also
resulted in the overturning of Pennsylvania's
discriminating sentencing procedure for female
76
defendants.
A third standard of review in equal protection decisions, labelled by one commentator as
the "newer equal protection," 77 is demonstrated by the eastern district of Pennsylvania's decision in Colorado Springs Amusement,
Ltd. v. Rizzo.78 An ordinance similar to the
one considered in Geisha House, forbidding
employees in massage parlors from tending to
persons of the opposite sex, was held to be in
violation of the equal protection clause. Even
though the court conceded that the city of
Philadelphia had a valid interest in prohibiting
illicit sexual behavior, the court scrutinized the
means employed in the ordinance to achieve
that goal and found it to be overly
restrictive. 79 The court did not apply the "sex
as a suspect classification" test which automatically would have meant the unconstitutionality
of the statute.8 0
76

See Commonwealth v. Butler,

-

Pa.

_

328

A.2d 851 (1974).
77 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection,86 HARv. I . R~v.1 (1972).
78 387 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
79 The court, using a due process analysis, also
found a "fundamental right" to operate a massage
parlor. Under this analysis, the state's failure to
demonstrate a compelling interest in the manner in
which it chose to regulate the activity was fatal.
However, in light of the decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), it is doubtful whether there are
"fundamental rights" beyond those explicitly announced in the Constitution.
80 According to one leading constitutional authority, use of the suspect classification has been
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This third approach exemplified by the Colorado Springs decision seems most in step
with recent Supreme Court decisions involving
sex-based classifications. 8 ' This, in practice, becomes a sliding scale test where both the interests affected by the legislative classification and
the particular characteristics of the class are
compared with the interests of the state in
maintaining the particular regulating scheme
as a means by which it reaches its goals.8 2
Under this test, a statute which draws a distinction by sex would be valid provided that
the court could ascertain the existence of a
substantial and rational link between the classification and the asserted state purpose.8 3 The
contours of this standard, however, are as yet
undetermined.
It is difficult to reconcile the decisions in
Devall with those in Geisha House and Colorado Springs Amusement. Until the Supreme
Court announces a clearer standard for review
of equal protection challenges to sex classifications, confusion in the lower courts will remain.
strict in theory and fatal in fact. Gunther, supra
note
8 1 77, at 8.
See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) ; Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
82 See Gunther, supranote 77.
83 Four Supreme Court justices in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), found sex to be
a "suspect classification." In Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), the sex-based classification required a "fair and substantial relation" between
the distinction drawn and the purpose for which it
was drawn. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), the Court found that a statute, which singled out pregnancy as the only significant disability not covered by the state-wide insurance program, was not a sex-based classification.

